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APOCALYPTIC WAR RHETORIC:  
DRUGS, NARCO-TERRORISM, AND A FEDERAL COURT NIGHTMARE FROM 
HERE TO GUANTANAMO 
 
 
Thomas A. Durkin* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Civil liberties in this country have changed over the last decade—a 
point made and repeated by commentators on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 and 
its ensuing “War on Terror.”1  Few would say this change is for the better.2  It 
is hardly the purpose of this paper to add more to that scholarly debate, save to 
add another vote on the side that things are worse—quite worse.  Nor, for a 
criminal trial lawyer, would it be prudent to attempt to wade too deep into 
academia and too far afield from one’s area of expertise.  Nevertheless, having 
been an active participant in the “War on Terror,” and its ugly older sister, the 
“War on Drugs,” it is the hope that a trial lawyer’s hands-on personal 
experience with federal criminal cases born of this poorly chosen war rhetoric 
and reactive Congressional legislation, such as the Comprehensive Crime 
Control and Bail Reform Acts of 1984, the 2006 Military Commissions Act, 
and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act—suggests that both wars, on 
drugs and on terror, are not only philosophically and politically related, but are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Attorney at Law, Durkin & Roberts, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., University of Notre Dame 
(General Program of Liberal Studies) 1968; J.D. University of San Francisco School of Law, 
1973.  Graduate Student At Large and Returning Scholar, University of Chicago, 2009 to the 
present. Law Clerk to the Honorable James B. Parsons, U.S. District Judge for the Northern 
District of Illinois; Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 1978 to 
1984; one of five lawyers selected nation-wide to be a participant in the John Adams Project, a 
joint collaboration of the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers to provide civilian counsel in the case of United States v. Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, et al., before the Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. See DURKIN & ROBERTS, http://www.durkinroberts.com. This article would not have 
been possible without the research and assistance of Gabriela McQuade, (J.D./LL.M), Duke 
University School of Law). A variation of this article was presented as a paper to the Notre 
Dame International Security Program on September 14, 2011, under the title: A View From 
Guantanamo to the Homeland: Counterterrorism War Rhetoric and the Conflation of the War 
on Drugs and the War on Terror. 
1 See, e.g., Vincent Warren, The 9/11 Decade and the Decline of U.S. Democracy, CENTER 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Sept. 8, 2011),  
http://ccrjustice.org/the911decade/declineofdemocracy; Lois Beckett, Braden Goyette & 
Marian Wang, The Best, Most Damning Reporting of the 9/11 Era, The PROPUBLICA BLOG 
(last updated Sept. 12, 2011, 11:16AM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/the-best-most-
damning-reporting-of-the-9-11-era (last visited Feb. 28, 2012); After 9/11: An E-Book 
Anthology, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 20, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/08/after-911-an-e-book-
anthology.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).  
2 See, Tawia Ansah, War: Rhetoric & Norm Creation In Response To Terror, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 797, 859 (2003).  
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actually becoming inextricably intertwined in both letter and spirit to form a 
single global war.   
The conflation of these wars and the ramifications of mixing the 
separate priorities of national security and domestic law enforcement (as well 
as the government branches and agencies responsible for each), into a single de 
facto militarized world police/spy force presents significant detrimental 
consequences both to civil liberties,3 everyday federal criminal practice, and 
even the relationship between domestic crime policy and international and 
foreign policy.4 Jonathan Hafetz explains, “[a]s the Bush presidency neared its 
end, approximately 250 prisoners were still being held in Guantanamo, 
hundreds more in Bagram, thousands in Iraq, and an undefined number in 
secret or proxy detention.  One person [Ali al-Marri] was still being detained 
as an “enemy combatant” inside the United States.”5 As we have come to find 
out, the situation remains relatively unchanged today, notwithstanding 
President Obama’s widely publicized National Archives speech on May 21, 
2009, in which he called for the closing of the detention facility at Guantanamo 
and the use of Article III Courts to try most terrorism cases except those 
involving the collection of “battlefield evidence.”  Presently, 171 detainees are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 An excellent discussion of the various complex issues surrounding terrorism detention 
and prosecution issues is set forth in a recent article by Professor Jonathan Hafetz of Seton 
Hall Law School, entitled Terrorism as Crime: Toward a Lawful and Sustainable Detention 
Policy.  This article, excerpted from Professor Hafetz’s forthcoming book on the right of 
habeas corpus after 9/11, cogently details the various policy issues surrounding terrorism 
detention issues and the related problem involving choice of forums to bring terrorism 
prosecutions: federal criminal courts; military commissions; or yet a third hybrid alternative 
that Professor Hafetz points out is gaining traction in academic and policymaking circles—that 
of a separate national security court.  Jonathan Hafetz, Terrorism as Crime: Toward a Lawful 
and Sustainable Detention Policy, in HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S 
NEW GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 205 (2011).  For a detailed and mind-numbing analysis of 
the political firestorm over Attorney General Holder’s decision to bring this case in New York, 
see Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle Over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, THE 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215fa_fact_mayer [hereinafter The 
Trial].  
4 See JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?: THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY FROM 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN 3 (2010).  Hagan presents an informative 
insider’s view of the shaping of crime policy under Ronald Reagan, and points out the always 
politicized nature of crime policy, with particular emphasis on what he calls the “street-and 
suite-linked” patterns of over-and-under control attributable to Reagan and the collapse of the 
U.S. economy.  Id.As Hagan points out, “the massive growth and overpopulation of U.S. 
prisons has combined with the deregulation and collapse of the U.S. economy in the age of 
Reagan to impose unsustainable costs.” Id. at 2.  On the international level, interestingly 
enough for our purposes, Hagan issues the following warning: “[o]ur politicized domestic 
crime wars feed into our policies on war crimes and state crimes in international conflict 
zones as far removed as Darfur and Iraq, adding global dimensions to our national crime 
politics.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). See also Melvyn P. Leffler, 9/11 in Retrospect: George W. 
Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 33, 33 (2011).    
5 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 205. 
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still at Guantanamo.6  Caving in to tremendous political and Congressional 
opposition to the 9/11 Conspiracy case being tried in the federal court in 
Manhattan, Obama has ordered that case returned to the Military Commissions 
in Guantanamo.  
 Despite this seeming stagnation of civil liberties, some commentators 
even suggest the “War on Terror” may, at a certain level, be on its way out.  A 
recent article in The Atlantic posits that the very federal agencies responsible 
for implementing the Bush Administration’s War on Terror in fact abandoned 
the war itself quite some time ago, well before the election of President 
Obama, or, at a minimum, left behind, the most contentious tactics that had 
come to define the war under the Bush/Cheney watch; i.e., preventative 
detentions, pain-based interrogation, ethnic and religious profiling, and widely 
expanded domestic surveillance powers. At least that is the premise of Nick 
Adams, Ted Nordhaus, and Michael Shellenberger, in their interesting and 
detailed analysis entitled Who Killed the War on Terror.7  They suggest that, 
similar to shifts in military policy in both Afghanistan and Iraq to a more 
discerning counterinsurgency strategy, the same kind of discerning shift in 
policies has been implemented in the United States’s non-military security and 
counterterrorism tactics.8 Interestingly enough, however, and quite to the point 
for our purposes insofar as civil liberties are concerned, the authors poignantly 
say that while the security establishment has moved on, “the political class 
remains stuck in the past.” Wanting to avoid the label “soft on terror,” they 
point out that policy-makers from President Obama to the Congress “continue 
to describe contemporary counterterrorism efforts in martial terms.”9   
 This insightful observation, that the political class remains trapped by 
the fear of being thought of as soft on either terror or crime, is quite apropos to 
the federal court as well, as anyone with even a passing familiarity with 
everyday federal criminal proceedings involving the wars on drugs and terror 
can attest.  No one in law enforcement today can seriously contend that the 
War on Drugs has succeeded.  Its failure is proven, if by nothing else, than by 
the steady or decreasing price of a kilogram of cocaine on the West Side of 
Chicago and the never ending supply of people willing to risk draconian prison 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, On the Tenth Anniversary of 
Guantánamo, the Center for Constitutional Rights Demands that President Obama Close 
Guantánamo (Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with author), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/tenth-anniversary-of-guant%C3%A1namo%2C-
center-constitutional-rights-demands-president-obama-close-guant%C3%A1na. 
7See Nick Adams, Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, Who Killed the War on 
Terror?, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/08/who-killed-the-war-on-terror/244273/.  
8 For some reasoning that may explain the wisdom of this decision it is worth reviewing 
the comment of fellow symposium panel member, Prof. John Mueller of Ohio State 
University.  See generally John Mueller, Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the 
Omnipresent Enemy, 85 FOREIGN AFFS. 2 (2006).   
9 Adams, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
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sentences for the lucrative and enormous profits of the drug trade.10  If that is 
not enough, one need only look south of the border to the horrible and absurd 
violence plaguing Mexico as a result of the Calderone Administration’s 
attempt to assist the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s attempt to 
prosecute and extradite leaders of the major drug cartels.11  And yet, after forty 
frustrating years, the War on Drugs remains a cornerstone of the domestic law 
enforcement political agenda.  
 Likewise, considerable attention and  skepticism is beginning to be paid 
to the utility and effectiveness of many of the domestic terrorism-related cases 
being brought in the federal courts under the expansive federal statutes for 
providing material support to Foreign Terrorist Organizations or Specially 
Designated Terrorist Organizations, 18 USC § 2339A, et seq.12  
 For that matter, some legal scholars, writers and policy makers have 
pointed out, that Bush’s, and now Obama’s, “War on Terror” may well be 
nothing more than “an extension—sometimes a grotesque one—of what we do 
in the name of the war on crime.”13    To get the full picture of the 
dangerousness of this war rhetoric insofar as civil liberties are concerned, 
though, “we must reach back well beyond George W. Bush to Richard Nixon, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See, e.g., James P. Gray, The Hopelessness of Drug Prohibition, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 
532 (2010).  James P. Gray is a retired judge of the Superior  Court in Orange County, 
California.  See also Mark Kleiman, Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars: Smarter Policies for 
Both Sides of the Border, 90 FOREIGN AFFS. 89, 92 (2011).  (“The market forces of 
replacement and adaption make the drug-dealing industry resilient even in the face of heavy 
enforcement: the United States sends five times as many drug dealers to prison today as it did 
30 years ago, but this has not prevented the 80-90 percent reductions in the prices of cocaine 
and heroin over that time, which came as a result of falling dealers’ wages and increased 
efficiency in trafficking.  Thus, conventional drug enforcement represents a dead end.”) 
11 See, e.g., Alma Guillermoprieto, The Murderers of Mexico, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
BOOKS, October 28, 2010; JUAN CARLOS GARZON, MAFIA & CO.: THE CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
IN MEXICO, BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA (2008); HOWARD CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: 
FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF EL PASO AND JUAREZ (2009). 
12 See, e.g., U.S. v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing the widely 
publicized case involving the Islamic Charity known as The Holy Land Foundation for Relief 
and Development); see also the controversial Supreme Court decision in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, et al., 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
13 James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How The War on Crime Helped Make the 
War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 332–33 (2009). Forman 
credits this point to John T. Parry, who “review[s] America’s historic and current uses of 
torture domestically and internationally and conclud[es] that torture may be compatible with 
American values in practice and with the legal system we have constructed to serve those 
values.” Id. at 333;  see also Aziz Z. Huq & Christopher Muller, The War on Crime as 
Precursor to the War on Terror, 36 INT’L J.L., CRIME & JUST. 215 (2008); Dorothy Roberts, 
Torture and the Biopolitics of Race, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (2008). For Obama’s adoption 
and continuation of much of Bush’s counterterrorism policies, see Glenn Greenwald, Obama’s 
Embrace of Bush Terrorism Policies is Celebrated as “Centrism,” SALON.COM (May 19, 
2009), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/05/19/obama. To his credit, 
however, Obama was quick to tone down the war rhetoric. See Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html.  
261 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 2012 
 261  
Ronald Reagan and the beginnings of the now infamous and perpetual War on 
Drugs that was already over forty years and counting when the airplanes struck 
the Twin Towers and Pentagon on 9/11.”14  In the 1960s, street crime was 
perceived as the ultimate villain, particularly in light of the inner-city riots of 
Detroit and Chicago.  In response, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act was passed in 1968.  By then, the War on Crime was ripe for 
congressional action.15  Three years later, when Richard Nixon declared “war 
on drugs” on June 17, 1971, he called drug abuse “public enemy number one 
in the United States.”  President Bill Clinton would use that same language to 
describe Osama bin Laden twenty-seven years later, following the East African 
embassy bombings.  
 The justification of national security concerns overriding civil liberties 
is nothing new, and much commentary has been dedicated to explaining its 
necessity—the most popular example being that of a fulcrum-like balancing 
obligation.  Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for 
one, has put it this way: “In times of danger, the weight of concerns for public 
safety increases relative to that of liberty concerns, and civil liberties are 
narrowed. In safer times, the balance shifts the other way and civil liberties are 
broadened.”16  This justification seems to underlie the general observation that, 
if given a choice between security and civil liberties, more often than not 
people will opt for security.  Legal and political philosopher Ronald Dworkin 
agrees that the fulcrum-like “image of striking a new balance is popular,” but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Nor is this to say, that all this apocalyptic fear-mongering can be laid at the feet of 
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, tempting as it is for one of college age in the late 1960s.  
Increasing scholarship seems to present compelling evidence of far deeper roots stretching as 
far back as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the “great” world wars over 
which they presided.  For a daunting and chilling look at the nationalistic practice of exploiting 
fear under the auspices of national security see the recent work of Jay Feldman entitled 
MANUFACTURING HYSTERIA: A HISTORY OF SCAPEGOATING, SURVEILLANCE, AND SECRECY IN 
MODERN AMERICA xviii  (Pantheon Books, 2011) (“[T]he recent excesses of the George W. 
Bush administration in attempting to put a stranglehold on civil liberties after 9/11 were not an 
anomaly . . . those extremes were a difference of degree, not kind.  It [the ‘seizing upon crises 
to incite emotional and irrational fears] has been happening in one form or another for over a 
century.”).    For a more broadly focused and excellent analysis of the use of war powers, war 
rhetoric and national security emergencies to expand executive authority and the scope of the 
federal government, see the recent work of the University of Chicago historian, JAMES T. 
SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT 
(2011); see also GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STATE (2010). 
15 The term “War on Crime” is considered to have been coined by Arizona senator and 
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1961, who noted the supposed breakdown of “law 
and order.” However, the phrase itself can be traced to a comic strip called “The War on 
Crime” started by legendary FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover in the 1930s.  Huq & Muller, supra 
note 13, at 216.  
16 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 1 (2006). 
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considers it “also particularly inapt.”17  Dworkin frames the question regarding 
this choice between liberty and security as a moral one, not simply a legal one.  
The issues involved in national security and detention policy extend far beyond 
normal governmental policy decisions such as inner-city roads and their impact 
on the environment.  Instead, with national security and civil liberties in 
question, the balancing metaphor obscures the underlying human rights 
issue,an argument surely not favored by Judge Posner and devotees of what 
has become known as the law-and-economics movement credited to the 
University of Chicago.18  Dworkin correctly insists that “[w]e must decide not 
where our own interest lies on balance but the very different question of what 
morality requires, even at the expense of our own interests.”19 As Dworkin 
goes on to say, “we cannot answer that [moral] question by asking whether the 
benefits of our policy outweigh its costs to us.”20 
 While much has been written about counterterrorism policy in the 
intervening years since Dworkin posed this question, far too little serious 
public debate has been had in this regard—not unlike, it is submitted, the same 
hand-wringing discourse in the equally thoughtless moral evaluation of the 
War on Drugs and the incarceral society it has wrought.21  Sound-bite political 
rhetoricians may find it expedient to use apocalyptic language to describe these 
post-9/11 times, just as they found it useful to dictate our approach to the 
scourge of crack cocaine years ago, but Dworkin’s question, and its moral 
focus, remains the correct one—particularly, one hopes, for a symposium at 
the nation’s premier Catholic University.22  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW 
POLITICAL DEBATE 27 (2006). 
18 Insofar as the war on drugs and the “tough on crime” massive U.S. prison population is 
concerned, it is well worth looking at the thoughtful analysis of the correlation between market 
deregulation and our ever increasing “incarceral society,” presented oddly enough by another 
current University of Chicago Law professor, Bernard E. Harcourt, in a recent book.  
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF 
NATURAL ORDER (2011).  Harcourt takes on his colleagues in the Chicago law-and-economic 
school, and rather convincingly demonstrates both what he calls the illusion of “free markets” 
and the “illusion of freedom.” It may well be less than a coincidence, therefore, that many of 
George W. Bush’s economic advisors in the fall of 2001 were also devotees of The Chicago 
School of Economics going back to Friedrich Hayek’s influence on Chicago economists 
Milton Friedman and George Stigler, and the lawyer Richard Epstein. For a concise history of 
both Chicago Schools, see id. at 121–50.  
19 DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 27 (emphasis added). 
20 Id.  
21 But see, e.g., CHARLES FRIED AND GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT IS WRONG: TORTURE, 
PRIVACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR (W.W. Norton & Co., 2010); 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010). 
22 It might be particularly helpful in this regard to pay close attention to John Patrick 
Diggins’ latest book, Why Niebuhr Now? (2011).  As Diggins points out discussing the revival 
of Niebuhr’s reputation these days, but not necessarily his ideas:  “[a]lone among modern 
thinkers, Niebuhr turned to religion for instruction on how to think about power.  Unlike those 
who now celebrate American ‘Unipower’ in a post-Cold War world, where it is thought that 
American military might can achieve moral ends for liberal democracy’s sake, Niebuhr 
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THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984: FROM PRE-TRIAL DOMESTIC DETENTION 
TO GUANTANAMO & INDEFINITE INTERNATIONAL DETENTION 
Thirty-seven years of practicing criminal law in the federal courts have 
resulted in witnessing changes in criminal procedural rights and constitutional 
protections that a law student educated in the early 1970s during the Warren 
Supreme Court would have thought mind-bogglingly impossible to have taken 
place in a single lifetime. But taken place they have, and then some!  
Professor Gerald G. Ashdown may have summed it up it best: “The 
reaction to the Vietnam War protest years, the presidency of Richard Nixon, 
and ultimately that of Ronald Reagan, ushered in a conservative revolution in 
the United States that still endures.  Republican Presidents during this period 
have appointed eleven Justices to the United States Supreme Court, seven of 
whom serve on the Court today.”23  Ashdown straightforwardly contends, quite 
consistently with this author’s experience in the federal courts, that well before 
9/11 and the declaration of the War on Terror, “the country and Supreme Court 
already had been fighting another war for thirty years—the so-called ‘War on 
Drugs’ [and this war] was every bit as devastating to civil liberties, although 
slower and more methodical, than our new ‘War on Terror’ promises to be.”24 
This too is quite consistent with this author’s experience, although equal, if not 
more, blame should be focused on the political litmus testing used to vet 
District Court appointees.  These judges make most of the routine decisions in 
the trial courts on motions to suppress evidence based upon Fourth 
Amendment violations.  These decisions have the potential to put defendants 
away for absurd amounts of time, particularly considering the draconian effects 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum statutory 
sentencing.  Ashdown also provides a very good history of the gradual erosion 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence facilitated by the War on Drugs.25 
It cannot go unmentioned that these judicially created exceptions 
incentivize the police to create false reports and outright lie in court.  Bold-
faced lying to justify the seizure of huge quantities of drugs,something once 
reserved for the province of the state courts, became silently accepted by many 
prosecutors and judges in the federal courts sadly permitting many deserving 
drug dealers a basis to go off to prison with a legitimate complaint about the 
system.  Over time, however, another curious and inexplicable phenomenon 
began to take place in the opposite direction.  Elected judges in state courts 
have now become far more likely to grant motions to suppress based upon 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
cautioned against identifying power with virtue.  It is a conceit of pride, Christianity’s fatal 
sin.”  Id. at 116.  Niebuhr’s popularity these days has been enhanced, in part, by President 
Obama’s endorsement of him as the most influential philosopher he has encountered.  Diggins 
would be worth the President’s attention.   
23 Gerald G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs 
and the War on Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 753 (2006). 
24 Id. at 755. 
25 Id. at 757–73. 
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lying police testimony than life-time appointed federal judges, regardless of the 
quantity of the drug seizure.    
 In hindsight, a good case can be made that war rhetoric was, perhaps, 
the single most important ingredient in the formula for this change.  Seizing 
upon the well worn fear-mongering trope, Congress reacted with a series of 
“tough on crime” pieces of legislation, beginning with the controversial 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.  All of a sudden, federal judges 
were compelled to take a tougher stance, both at sentencing and—for the very 
first time—in detaining defendants prior to trial, pursuant to the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984.26   
 In 1985, in the middle of a thirteen-week narcotics conspiracy jury trial 
in the federal court in Chicago, the government suddenly filed a motion to 
revoke our client’s bond.27  The Bail Reform Act had just gone into effect and, 
for the very first time, pre-trial detention was authorized in the federal courts.  
Our case was one of the very first attempts to impose pre-trial detention under 
the Act at the Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago.  Defense lawyers were 
aghast, as it had generally been presumed that the Eighth Amendment 
guaranteed bail in all but some rare exceptions, primarily in capital cases.  
Even prosecutors were leery of the constitutionality of the Act and, to mollify 
judges reviewing early challenges to the Act, Attorney General William French 
Smith went so far as to issue a memorandum to U.S. Attorneys across the 
country narrowly prescribing the government’s intended use of pre-trial 
detention to only the most serious cases involving the most dangerous 
offenders.28  18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) provides for a rebuttable presumption 
that any defendant charged in a narcotics offense with a maximum sentence of 
ten years is both a danger to the community and a risk of flight. Virtually every 
federal narcotics offense carries a penalty of ten years or more.  While this 
rebuttable presumption can be overcome by the presentation of defense 
evidence, the statute also provides for a minimum three-day detention upon 
motion of the government.  Such a rebuttable presumption also applies to 
defendants charged in various other federal crimes— primarily those of a 
violent nature.  However, pre-trial detention can also be sought under the Act 
for any defendant charged in federal court upon a showing by the government 
by clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions of bail that will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006), et seq.  
27 United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1987).  Napue had been a long-time 
West Side narcotics dealer whose relatively lengthy criminal history “rap sheet” demonstrated 
convincingly that he always showed up for court.  The government argued, notwithstanding 
the rap sheet’s lack of any history of violence, that he was a “danger to the community” based 
upon an incident with a girlfriend where he supposedly told her to be careful while he had his 
arm on the console of his automobile where she knew he sometimes kept a gun. See id. 
28 For a more extensive explanation of the operation of the detention/release provisions of 
the statute, see Ann M. Overbeck, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
55 U. CIN. L. REV. 153, 160–65 (1986).  
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assure either the safety of the community or that the defendant is not a risk of 
flight.  
In response to our argument that this statute was both absurd and 
unconstitutional because it would only be a matter of time before the 
government began seeking the pre-trial detention of white-collar defendants, 
government prosecutors accused us of hyperbole and pointed to Attorney 
General Smith’s memorandum as assurance that the government could most 
certainly be trusted not to abuse its authority. The trial judge denied the 
government’s motion, as much for not wanting to disrupt an ongoing trial and 
jeopardizing the appellate record, as for anything else, it seemed.  
 It did not take long for our prediction that the government would seek 
to detain white-collar defendants while they awaited trial to become a reality—
less than two years, if memory serves.  William Stoecker, a young 
businessman from Chicago’s south suburbs, had been charged in 1987 with 
bankruptcy fraud for allegedly providing false schedules in a widely-publicized 
involuntary bankruptcy filed against his business empire, the Grabill 
Corporation.  Grabill and its demise was said to have been the cause of the 
downfall of the Bank of New England in the days when lending money to the 
“rust belt” was popular with investment bankers.  Stoecker had no criminal 
history whatsoever and had longstanding ties to the Chicago area, two factors 
under § 3142 of the criminal code that weighed heavily in favor of his release.  
Nor could anyone suggest that bankruptcy fraud endangered the community.  
Instead, the government argued that since the Bankruptcy Trustee and the FBI 
had not been able to trace what happened to the millions loaned to Grabill, 
Stoecker might have placed it offshore, and was, thus, a potential risk of flight.  
This argument fell on very deaf ears, perhaps because federal Judges and 
Magistrates were still too unaccustomed to the idea of locking people up pre-
trial.  It was fortunate for Stoecker that this was the case, as about a year and a 
half later a federal jury acquitted him of the bankruptcy fraud charges on all 
counts.  
 Time, however, gradually eroded this judicial resistance to pre-trial 
detention, which by now has led to an entirely new judicial approach that some 
legal commentators have described as the “new normal.”29  And new and 
normal it indeed is,at least from the perspective of 1987.  Today, pre-trial 
detention is the norm, not the exception. In the latest Department of Justice 
figures available, those for the fiscal year 2009, only 30.7 percent of the 98,748 
defendants charged in the federal courts nationwide were released on bond.30  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, introduction to ASSESSING THE NEW 
NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES, i (2003), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf. 
30 MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009 
– STATISTICAL TABLES 12 (2011) [hereinafter JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009], available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2374. In the preceding fiscal year, 2008, 
28.5% of the 91,017 were released. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
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This is the case, notwithstanding our cherished belief that our system affords 
every defendant the presumption of innocence, unless and until guilt is proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Tell this to the 68,472 pre-trial detainees in fiscal 
year 2009, or the 65,109 detainees from the previous year and you may get a 
different opinion of this long cherished tradition that, frankly, is respected 
more in the breach than anything else.  In that the Department of Justice 
detention figures do not specifically categorize terrorism-related cases, the 
release rate for “Violent Offenses,” which would include terrorism related 
offenses, is lower than average, or only 23 percent.31  However, based on the 
author’s experience, very few terrorism-related defendants are ever released on 
bail.  
The very fact of pre-trial detention in terrorism related cases also 
produces even greater challenges regarding representation than are 
encountered in the normal pre-trial detainee case.  Most often, if not always, 
pre-trial detainees in terrorism related cases are placed arbitrarily by the 
Warden of the Bureau of Prisons facility in solitary confinement or “the SHU,” 
an acronym for Segregated Housing Unit.  Not only does this create the 
enormous psychological problems associated with twenty-three-hours-a-day 
solitary confinement,32 it also greatly restricts access to counsel and discovery 
materials.  At most Bureau of Prisons facilities, inmates in the general 
population are afforded email access that permits email contact with lawyers 
and certain approved family members.  In addition, since federal criminal 
discovery has gone the way of big-firm civil litigation digital discovery these 
days, access to computers is essential for inmates to review their case.  Inmates 
in solitary at the SHU have far less access to computers and, thus, far less 
access to the discovery.33  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2008 – STATISTICAL TABLES, Table 3.1 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1745. In 2007, 36.1% of defendants were 
released. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES, (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2196.These figures are based upon the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Pretrial Services Act Information System. 
31 See JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009, supra note 30,  at 12. 
32 For the effects of twenty-three-hours-a-day solitary confinement, see generally, Stuart 
Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325 (2006). 
33 There is little question that U.S. Attorneys Offices in large metropolitan areas are now 
“big firms,” in every sense of the word.  Likewise, there is a growing tendency and preference 
towards career prosecutors these days. If it were in the private world of Chicago law firms, the 
Chicago U.S. Attorneys Office with its 170 attorneys would currently rank eighteenth in the 
number of local lawyers. See Crain’s List Largest Law Firms, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, 
Feb. 21, 2011 at 35, available at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/section/lists (detailing how 
the 17th largest firm has 172 local attorneys whereas the 18th largest firm has 159 local 
attorneys). In addition to career prosecutors, in another rather odd twist from days gone-by, 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys are now being recruited from big law firms which also seems to be 
creating an interesting revolving door with some attendant consequences, intended or not.  
Young big-firm associates become Assistant U.S. Attorneys and then leave for partnerships, 
often in the same firm from which they came.  Whether the onset of digital discovery in federal 
criminal cases can be directly attributed to this revolving door is anyone’s guess, but it is worth 
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The conditions of such pre-trial solitary confinement are all the more 
exacerbated by the fact that discovery in terrorism-related cases is always 
greatly prolonged by the declassification problems related to classified 
evidence and its use in the federal courts pursuant to Classified Information 
Procedures Act (“CIPA”).34  As has been suggested by one commentator with 
extensive terrorism-related defense experience, “the government’s exclusive 
control over critical aspects of the litigation and proceedings conducted 
pursuant to CIPA often undermines the statute’s legislative intent.”35  Dratel 
goes on to suggest—correctly, this author believes—that the government 
“achieves this control by determining whether and what classified material to 
declassify in preparation for a criminal prosecution and trial, including a 
defendant’s own communications intercepted pursuant to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).”  In that virtually every federal 
terrorism-related prosecution involves classified information covered by CIPA, 
as well as evidence obtained under FISA, the impact of the use of this 
“sword,”intentional or not on the part of the government agencies or 
prosecutors,as it impacts the ability of a pre-trial detainee to put up with the 
conditions of solitary confinement, prepare his defense, and go through the 
rigors of an arduous trial becomes very, very real.  
 Not surprisingly, most terrorism-related cases end up in guilty pleas. 
Aside from the draconian sentencing options called for under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, sheer exhaustion and hopelessness encouraged by the 
conditions of confinement takes a large toll as well. For the calendar year 
ending December 31, 2010, the same Department of Justice Statistics relating 
to detention and release reflect that there were only forty-five “terrorism” 
defendants that year. The cases of eight defendants were dismissed, leaving 
only thirty-seven defendants to proceed to judgment. Of those thirty-seven 
defendants, thirty-two plead guilty and the remaining five were found guilty 
after jury trials.  
THE JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATION AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
 In a country that accepts the pre-trial detention of 71.5 percent of its 
criminal defendants in its federal courts, it probably should not be a surprise 
why the summary detention of over 700 foreign Muslim nationals at a Gulag in 
the Caribbean has gained enough popular political support to override a 
campaign promise of an incoming President,a promise that was supported not 
only by his opponent, Senator John McCain, but also by his predecessor, 
George W. Bush and his predecessor’s Secretary of State, Colin Powell.  
 While the history of the quick decision that lead to the choice of 
Guantanamo and its early growing pains is already the subject of a number of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
thinking about. The pros and cons on the issue of career prosecutors can also be framed in 
terms very similar to that of a conscripted versus a volunteer/mercenary army. 
34 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2006).  
35 Joshua L. Dratel, Sword or Shield? The Government’s Selective Use of Its 
Declassification Authority for Tactical Advantage in Criminal Prosecutions, 5 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 171, 171 (2006).   
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books,36 more important for our purposes is the legal basis behind the detention 
policy.  It is a bit less complicated and sophisticated than the Bail Reform Act 
of 1984, to put it mildly.  On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a 
Military Order entitled Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.  This order, interestingly enough, was 
modeled after and made reference to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Proclamation 2561 issued in July of 1942 in the early stages of World War II.37  
Roosevelt’s order denied certain enemies access to the courts, namely any 
residents of a nation with whom we were at war and who, at the direction of 
that nation, entered the country and were charged with committing or 
attempting to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or other 
violations of the laws of war.38  In contrast to Roosevelt’s order, Bush’s order 
broke new ground in its breadth and ambiguity.  As has been pointed out, 
Bush’s order “recognized no legal or procedural checks on the president’s 
proclaimed powers.”  Nor did it take into account significant changes in 
international law since FDR’s order, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and a new U.S. Code of Military Justice.39  Further, Bush’s order, in addition 
to detention authority, gave the Secretary of Defense the ability to “wield 
authority over the [very] tribunals under which [the detainees] [] would be 
tried.”40  Put another way, this empowered the Department of Defense to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 See, e.g., JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
(2006); CLIVE STAFFORD-SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING 
JUSTICE IN GUANTANAMO BAY (2007);  MOAZZAM BEGG & VICTORIA BRITAIN, ENEMY 
COMBATANT: MY IMPRISONMENT AT GUANTANAMO, BAGRAM, AND KANDAHAR (2006). For a 
more detailed explanation of the decision making, or lack thereof, on Guantanamo, 
extraterritorial rendition, torture and the variety of related problems that this detention policy 
spawned, see JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008).  
37 See KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 3 
(2009).  Greenberg’s book provides a very insightful history of how Guantanamo came to be 
chosen as the place to take General Tommy Franks’ early detainees in the Afghan war in the 
first place, and the growing pains it went through in its early days.  Based in large part upon 
very candid interviews of the military personnel involved in the decision making processes, it 
is both very informative and consistent with conversations this author has had in Guantanamo 
with those officers who were there at the beginning. One overriding factor mentioned by 
Greenberg, and confirmed in the local pub where everyone congregates in the evenings on the 
island, was that Guantanamo got the detainees out of the cold Afghan winter and avoided the 
potential scandal that would have resulted in large numbers of detainees freezing to death.  As 
Greenberg also points out, Guantanamo had been used in the 1990s as a detention facility for 
Cuban and Haitian refugees and it had an operational hospital to treat the wounded.  See id. at 
2–16. 
38 See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942) [hereinafter Proclamation 
2561]. 
39 GREENBERG, supra note 36, at 3. 
40 Id. In hindsight, this was a harbinger of the controversy that arose after the President’s 
National Archives speech ordering the closing of Guantanamo and Attorney General Holder’s 
later decision to bring the 9/11 Conspiracy Case to the federal court in Manhattan. For the 
tortured history and galvanized Republican reaction to this decision, see The Trial, supra note 
3.  
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override the Department of Justice and to push “domestic courts as well as 
international [courts] [] out of the picture.”41 
  Bush’s Military Order authorizing the Department of Defense to detain 
“individuals subject to the order” and try them by military commissions relied 
directly upon the now well-known congressional Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Act (“AUMF”).42  That statute has served, for all intents and 
purposes, as the legal footing for much of the War on Terror, at least insofar as 
Guantanamo detention policy and the use of military commissions is 
concerned.   
 Bush’s Presidential Military Order declaring that “an extraordinary 
emergency exists for national defense purposes” is well worth reading in its 
entirety.  The apocalyptic language contemplates nothing less than the very 
continuation of the government hanging in the balance:  
Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international 
terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to 
undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, 
if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass 
injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at 
risk the continuity of the operations of the United States 
government.43  
“REGULAR DETAINEES” (“ISNS”) VS. “HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” (“HVDS”) 
 In order to understand the mess that Guantanamo detention policy has 
become, both domestically and internationally, it is important to distinguish 
between two very different types of detainees at Guantanamo.  The Bush 
administration’s early claim that it had captured “the worst of the worst” and 
sent them to Guantanamo44 led to all kinds of distortions in the ensuing policy 
debates on both sides.  In reality, only a small handful of detainees come close !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 GREENBERG, supra note 36, at 3.  Roosevelt’s order specifically provided that the 
Attorney General could, with the approval of the Secretary of War, provide regulations for 
providing remedies or proceedings in U.S. Courts.  See Proclamation 2561, supra note 38. 
42 Id. 
43 Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 § c (2001), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/mil_ord_001.asp (emphasis added).  For an interesting 
examination of the Islamic apocalyptic movement and its similarities with Christian 
movements, see generally JEAN-PIERRE FILIU, APOCALYPSE IN ISLAM (2011). As an aside, the 
accuracy of this fear of Al Qaeda’s capabilities has been repeatedly questioned. See, e.g., Scott 
Shane, Al Qaeda’s Outsize Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/qaeda.html.  
44 Former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld first used that label in early 2002. See 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Some Guantanamo Prisoners Will Be Freed Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/international/americas/23GUAN.html. 
The label was again used by Vice-President Richard Cheney as late as 2009, notwithstanding 
considerable evidence to the contrary by that time. See Cheney: Gitmo holds ‘worst of the 
worst,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 6, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31052241/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/cheney-gitmo-holds-
worst-worst.    
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to being the “worst of the worst” by anyone’s definition, and all in that small 
handful are the “High Value Detainees.”  Most of the HVDs are ones the 
government believes are responsible for actual terrorist acts, and many of them 
will be prosecuted and afforded considerable due process in either Article III 
federal courts or the Military Commissions under the revised Military 
Commissions Act.45  Ironically, virtually all of the much larger subset of 
“regular” detainees languished, or continue to languish, for years on end with 
virtually no due process,except for limited habeas corpus review in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia.46  Nevertheless, in the public and 
congressional hysteria over the detainees, it is always the “worst of the worst” 
that dictate the course of the detainee debate.    
 Almost ten years after the arrival of the first planeloads of detainees in 
January of 2002, and nearly three years after President Obama’s National 
Archives Speech in May 2009 announcing his intention to close Guantanamo, 
the numbers may well say it all insofar as the wrongheadedness of the 
debate—a debate that is deliberately obfuscated by the refusal to distinguish 
between the “high value” and “regular” detainees.  Or, to borrow comparative 
terminology from the War on Drugs, the ongoing debate in opposition to 
closing Guantanamo is being dominated by concerns over what to do with the 
few “kingpins,” while hundreds more “mopes” languish without any 
meaningful resolution. 
 According to statistics compiled by the Center for Constitutional Rights 
in New York City (“CCR”), as of September 7, 2011, 600 men have already 
been released from Guantanamo.  One hundred seventy-one men, from twenty-
three countries, remain imprisoned—many now going on ten years.  Ninety-
two percent of the men ever held in Guantanamo are not Al-Qaeda fighters by 
the U.S. government’s own records.  Eighty-nine men have been cleared for 
release from Guantanamo but remain in detention.  Fifty-eight Yemeni men are 
cleared to be sent back home, but remain indefinitely detained based solely on 
their nationality.  Forty-six men are slated for indefinite detention without 
charge or trial, as the government claims these men can be neither released 
nor prosecuted.  Twenty-two or more prisoners were under eighteen when 
captured.  Eight men have died in the prison.  Seven men have been charged 
with a crime, and two of those men are now free.47   In short, it is only the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 See, e.g., HAFETZ, supra note 3, at 205; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT 
ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006); Diane F. Orentlicher 
& Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military 
Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 653, 653 (2002).  
46 See infra note 46, for the procedural history of these habeas claims and Detainee 
Treatment Act cases.  
47 Guantanamo by the Numbers: What You Should Know & Do About Guantanamo, CTR. 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (January 18, 2012), 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Guantanamo_Numbers_18Jan2012.pdf (emphasis added). These 
figures are based in large part on several exhaustive studies conducted by Prof. Mark 
Denbeaux of the Seton Hall Law School. See, e.g., MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, 
REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF 
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forty-six detainees who supposedly can be neither released nor prosecuted who 
are driving the debate.48   
 A significant number of the remaining detainees have continued to 
pursue habeas litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
largely with the help of pro bono lawyers throughout the country, including 
many from large prestigious law firms.  The numbers in these cases also tell a 
shocking tale.  As of September 2, 2011, based upon a running survey being 
maintained by Guantanamo habeas lawyers, of the sixty-one habeas decisions 
so far on the merits, thirty-eight detainees have prevailed on the merits, while 
only twenty-three habeas petitions have been denied.  This is a shocking, if not 
scandalous, statistic considering the very extraordinary nature of a writ of 
habeas corpus and the rarity in which one is usually granted in the federal 
courts.  In another context, for example, the granting of a far smaller number of 
post-conviction petitions in Illinois capital convictions led to a moratorium and 
ultimately to the repeal of the death penalty in Illinois.   
 High Value Detainees (“HVDs”) are truly horses of a different color.  If 
anyone fits Rumsfeld’s and Cheney’s label of “the worst of the worst,” some 
of these detainees could no doubt be said to qualify.  This is certainly the case 
with the most notorious HVD, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who boastfully 
admitted his role as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks throughout the earlier 
proceedings in the Military Commissions at Guantanamo.49  These and most 
HVD detainees, however, were not first sent to Guantanamo.  Instead they 
were only brought to Guantanamo in October of 2006, after having first been 
sent to the infamous “ghost prisons” as part of the CIA’s now infamous 
“extraordinary rendition” program.50  The length of these CIA renditions, the 
locations of the black sites, and what occurred at the sites continues to remain 
mostly classified, but has become the subject of considerable public 
controversy in what is now known as the “Torture Debate.”51  This debate, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA (Feb. 8, 2006), 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf. 
48 This is, of course, the price regularly paid in our criminal justice system as the price of 
the presumption of innocence and requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as 
was widely evidenced in the recent New York case involving IMF Director and French 
presidential candidate, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. See Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Times Topics, 
N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/dominique_strausskahn/index.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).  
49 See Mark Mazzetti & Margot Williams, In Tribunal Statement, Confessed 9/11 Plotter 
Burnishes His Image as a Solider,  N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/washington/16khalid.html. 
50 For an excellent history of the origin of this program, see MAYER, supra note 35, at p. 
102–15, 128–29, 225; see also, Stephen Braun et al., Secret CIA Terrorist Prisoner Flights to 
‘Black Site’ Prisons Detailed in Lawsuits, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 1, 2011, available at 
http://blog.al.com/wire/2011/09/secret_cia_terrorist_prisoner.html.  
51 See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
AMERICAN VALUES (2008); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: 
Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 312–13 
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which is far beyond the confines of this paper other than perhaps as it relates to 
Dworkin’s moral question, includes the very question as to whether the torture 
even worked in the first place.52  To date, in addition to the five HVD 
defendants charged in the military commissions in the 9/11 Conspiracy Case, 
nineteen other cases have been brought in the Commissions against individual 
HVD defendants.53 
  What will happen to the remaining HVDs or those other detainees 
whom the government claims can neither be prosecuted nor released, is 
anyone’s guess at this point.  The only thing that can be said with any certainty 
is that resistance to closing Guantanamo and bringing the detainees to U.S soil 
has gained so much political traction that Guantanamo and the Military 
Commissions are likely to become permanent fixtures for the foreseeable 
future.  Whether this opposition is simply out of spite against President 
Obama, or has large political support beyond hard right Republicans is difficult 
to say as well. The recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 is relentless in its use of the military to handle as 
many terrorists as possible.  The bill’s passage by both houses of Congress 
does suggest that, either because of an actual belief in Guantanamo’s necessity, 
or because of an aversion to being perceived as weak on terror, much of 
Congress is comfortable with the status quo, just as it was comfortable with the 
castration of the Fourth Amendment when it came to drug kingpins.  
While the Obama Administration may be criticized for failing to act on 
its promises with the required courage and decisiveness, it is clear that the 
Administration’s efforts have been continuously hampered by congressional 
action that contrasted with the deferential reign given to President Bush on 
detainee matters.  The signing statement to the 2012 NDAA issued by 
President Obama reinforces this chasm of support: no less than seven times in 
under 2000 words, he clarifies that his administration will interpret the statute 
to allow for the necessary “flexibility” to address America’s national security 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(2006); Jeannine Bell, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. 
L.J. 339, 353 (2008); Lisa Hajjar, Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice 
in Historical and Global Perspective, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 311, 332–35 (2009); 
Kenneth J. Levit, The CIA and the Torture Controversy: Interrogation Authorities and 
Practices in the War on Terror, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL’Y 341, 341 (2005). 
52 See, e.g., Scott Shane, Ex-FBI Agent Cites High-Level Dysfunction over 9/11, N.Y. 
TIMES, September 11, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/us/12agent.html 
(detailing the comments of Ali H. Soufan, concerning interrogation of the first HVD, Abu 
Zabaydah);  see also ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 9/11 AND 
THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA (2011).  
53 United States Department of Defense, Military Commissions, THE PENTAGON, 
http://www.defense.gov/Utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/news/comm
issions.html, last visited Sept. 12, 2011. This website, in addition to providing links to the 
actual case files of these proceedings, also provides links to the Military Commissions Act, as 
well as the Military Commissions Manual, Regulation, Trial Judiciary Rules of Court, and the 
United States Court of Military Commission Review.   
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concerns.54  A decade ago, executive discretion on this matter was readily 
granted, leaving the rest of us to wonder whether Congress’s restrictive 
language is part of the expanding and contracting circle of executive 
overreaching and congressional correction, or if congressional preference for 
the military, and the President’s aversion to that single path, in fact suggests 
something far more sinister about the direction of individual rights and the 
flow of information.  
By invoking military detention and prosecution for such a large portion 
of terror cases, Congress is controlling the perception of this threat, suggesting 
that the dangers to national security are simply too great and unique to be 
handled by traditional civilian or even military courts.  This is yet another 
example of incendiary apocalyptic language used to achieve a political 
objective.  The demand for military detention, at the expense of civil rights, not 
only intrudes “into the functions and prerogatives of the Department of 
Justice,”55 with regard to prosecutorial discretion, but also removes any 
civilian DOJ determination of the appropriate parameters for detention.  These 
parameters involve not only treatment and location, but also duration and the 
means of challenging one’s detention.  The NDAA debate has touched very 
raw nerves in this country, and goes to the heart of the issue with respect to 
war terminology, fear and apocalyptic rhetoric.56  A look at this oppositional 
history is telling and ominous.   
In November 2009, Republican Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX) 
introduced House Resolution 4127, which would have required trial by 
Military Commission for unprivileged enemy belligerents being tried for 
conduct for which a term of incarceration or the death penalty may be sought.  
More worryingly still, on March 4, 2010, Senator John McCain introduced the 
Enemy Belligerent, Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act, which 
would have allowed the President to imprison an unlimited number of 
American citizens (as well as foreigners) indefinitely without trial, simply by 
designating that person an “enemy belligerent.”57 The bill explicitly 
contemplated that indefinite detention could be imposed on American citizens:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 See Statement by the President on H.R. 1540, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-
1540. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Michael McAuliff, Guantanamo Bay 10th Anniversary: Obama’s Detention 
Law Could Fill Prison Obama Tried to Close, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/11/guantanamo-bay-10th-anniversary-indefinite-
detention-american-citizens_n_1197547.html; Joshua Dratel, A Loaded Gun, GUERNICA 
MAGAZINE, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.guernicamag.com/blog/3396/joshua_dratel_tbd/; Kate 
Martin, A Peculiar and Pernicious Myth:  Domestic Military Detentions, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kate-martin/defense-authorization-
act_b_1201668.html. 
57 See Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, S. 3081, 
111th Cong. (2010). 
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An individual, including a citizen of the United States, 
determined to be an unprivileged enemy belligerent . . . may be 
detained without criminal charges and without trial for the 
duration of hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners in which the individual has engaged, or which the 
individual has purposely and materially supported, consistent 
with the law of war and any authorization for the use of military 
force provided by Congress pertaining to such hostilities.58  
After neither of these bills became laws, the Republican-controlled 
House adopted a new tactic to limit presidential decision-making power over 
the future of Guantanamo detainees. In December 2010, the House added 
Guantanamo provisions to a military spending bill, banning the use of federal 
money to bring Guantanamo detainees into the country for any purpose, 
including trials, whether military or civilian. The provisions also made it 
difficult to transfer the detainees to foreign countries, even if they were 
deemed safe to release. In response, Attorney General Holder sent a sharply-
worded letter to Senate leaders, urging them not to pass the spending bill, 
which he characterized as “an extreme and risky encroachment on the authority 
of the Executive branch to determine when and where to prosecute terrorist 
suspects.”59    
While President Obama could have vetoed the spending bill, his 
administration claimed it was reluctant to block legislation primarily aimed at 
authorizing military pay and benefits. Obama finally chose to go the route of 
ratifying the bill while issuing “signing statements” stating his strong 
opposition to the Guantanamo provisions and expressing his intention to work 
with Congress to seek their repeal.60  The same pattern, however, repeated 
itself in 2011.  In June of that year, the Obama administration criticized the 
2012 fiscal year military spending bill, to which were similarly annexed 
Guantanamo provisions, suggesting this time that the President would consider 
a veto if the bill “undermine[d] his ability as commander-in-chief or include[d]  
ideological or political policy riders.”61 In late December of 2011, the White 
House was still threatening to veto the bill, a stance which lasted until !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Id. 
59 Dafna Linzer, Obama Administration Plans Guantanamo Showdown with Congress, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/03/obama-
administration-guantanamo-congress_n_803752.html; Charlie Savage, Holder Denounces a 
Bill to Ban Detainee Transfers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/us/politics/10gitmo.html.  
60 SEE Z. BYRON WOLF, PRESIDENT OBAMA SIGNS PENTAGON SPENDING BILL, ISSUES 
“SIGNING STATEMENT” OPPOSING PROVISIONS BANNING GITMO DETAINEE TRANSFER TO US, 
ABC News, JAN. 7, 2011, HTTP://ABCNEWS.GO.COM/BLOGS/POLITICS/2011/01/PRESIDENT-
OBAMA-SIGNS-PENTAGON-SPENDING-BILL-ISSUES-SIGNING-STATEMENT-OPPOSING-PROVISIONS-
BANNING-GI/.  
61 David Alexander, White House Criticizes House Defense Spending Bill, REUTERS, June 
23, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/23/usa-budget-defense-
idUSN1E75M1T120110623.  
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sufficient changes had been made that the President was confident “that the 
language does not challenge or constrain the President’s ability to collect 
intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the American 
people.”62 Among others, slight changes were made to maintain the 
Executive’s prerogative in selecting whether or not  to place someone in 
military custody.  In an incredibly revealing bit of history, much of the 
disagreement surrounding the 2012 NDAA involved citizen detention 
provisions highly similar to those at issue with Sen. McCain’s proposed 2010 
amendment.  As a concession to avoid the veto threat, Democrats and 
Republicans agreed on an evasive provision that “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of 
United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other 
persons who are captured or arrested in the United States.”63  President Obama 
signed the bill on December 31, 2011, again issuing a signing statement 
clarifying his administration’s interpretation of Executive war powers.  
However, the provisions restricting detainee transfer to the United States and 
preferring military detention for the vast majority of terror suspects remain in 
the Act, signing statement or not.  
In this tug-of-war between the President and Congress, it is 
disappointing but hardly surprising to observe the Administration’s waffling 
on one of the most pressing and controversial issues concerning Guantanamo.  
In November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that five 
detainees allegedly responsible for the 9/11 attacks, including our client Ramzi 
Bin Al Shibh, would be tried in the lower Manhattan federal court for the 
Southern District of New York.  This decision, which seemed a logical and 
appropriate “no-brainer” from a legal and policy standpoint, particularly in 
light of the careful analysis and conclusions set forth in the President’s 2009 
National Archives Speech, was met with tremendous hostility.  On February 2, 
2010, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) introduced a bill to prohibit the use of 
Department of Justice funds for the prosecution in Article III courts of any 
individuals involved in the September 11th attacks.64 In March 2010, Obama’s 
advisors recommended reversing Holder’s plan. On March 7, 2011, the Obama 
administration created the first formal indefinite detention system in 
Guantanamo. At the same time, President Obama issued an Executive Order 
providing that continued detention was warranted if it was “necessary to 
protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States,” and 
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62 Statement by the White House Press Secretary, Dec. 14, 2011, as quoted in Charlie 
Savage, Obama Drops Veto Threat Over Military Authorization Bill After Revisions, N.Y. 
TIMES, December 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/politics/obama-wont-
veto-military-authorization-bill.html 
63 See H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1021(e) (2011). 
64 Bill to prohibit the use of Department of Justice funds for the prosecution in Article III 
courts of the United States of individuals involved in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
S. 2977, 111th Cong. (2010).  
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creating a periodic detention review system.65 On April 4, 2011, Attorney 
General Eric Holder and the Obama administration gave in to the political 
hostility against the decision to try the 9/11 case in New York and announced 
that it would be reinstituted in military commissions at Guantanamo. 66 Finally, 
on May 27, 2011, Obama signed the Republican-backed extension of the 
PATRIOT Act, allowing intelligence agencies to continue conducting roving 
surveillance, collecting business documents and conducting surveillance of 
“lone wolf” operators, who are not acting against the U.S. as part of an 
established terrorist group, for another six years.67 
NARCO-TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
 From trying to detain the likes of Bill Stoecker pre-trial in 1987, to the 
staggering current pre-trial detention statistics, along with serious legislation 
for indefinite preventative detention and the myriad of problems created by the 
post 9/11 counterterrorism legislation, a new form of federal criminal 
prosecution and detention combining both the “War on Drugs” and the “War 
on Terror” is beginning to appear in the federal courts, with relatively little 
notice or fanfare.  For one good example, it is worth looking at two recent 
indictments in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.  
In announcing on July 26, 2011, the unsealing of indictments against Taza Gul 
Alizai, Siavosh Henareh, Bachar Wehbe and Cetin Aksu, U.S. Attorney Preet 
Bharara took a page from the well-worn national security apocalyptic fear 
playbook: “[T]oday’s indictments provide fresh evidence of what many of us 
have been seeing for some time: the growing nexus between drug trafficking 
and terrorism, a nexus that threatens to become a clear and present danger to 
our national security.”  Bharara went on to add, one assumes to defuse the 
obvious questions of jurisdiction over foreign nationals outside the U.S.: “[A]s 
crime goes global, the long arm of the law has to get even longer.”68  Bold 
words indeed, and as one commentator mentioned, this arrest “shine[s] a light 
on an aspect of the war on terror that is less visible and rarely reported on.  
While the connection between drug trafficking and the funding of terrorists is 
well known, it is rare to see DEA operations such as this that expose the direct 
links between the two.”69 
 Alizai, an Afghan national, is charged in a four-count indictment with 
violations of, among other things, Title 21, United States Code, Section 960a, 
which makes it a crime to “provide a thing of pecuniary value to a person !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 SEE EXEC. ORDER NO. 13567, 76 FED. REG. 13277 (MAR. 7, 2011). 
66 See Guantanamo Bay Timeline, THE WASHINGTON POST, available at 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/timeline/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
67 See Jim Abrams, Patriot Act Extension Signed by Obama, HUFFINGTON POST, July 26, 
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/27/patriot-act-extension-signed-obama-
autopen_n_867851.html.  
68 See Feds: Taliban Supporter Charged in Drug Sting, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 26, 2011, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-07-26-dea-drugs-taliban_n.htm.  
69 Wes Bruer, 4 Detained in Narco-Terror Case Abroad, THREAT MATRIX: A BLOG OF 
THE LONG WAR JOURNAL, July 26, 2011, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2011/07/four_detained_in_narco-terror.php (last visited 2/29/2012). 
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engaging in terrorist activity.”  The indictment alleges that Alizai, “who lives 
and operates in Afghanistan,” provided heroin [the thing of pecuniary value] to 
“the Taliban, and its members, operatives and associates, having knowledge 
that said persons and organization have engaged in and engage in terrorism and 
terrorist activity, which activity violates the criminal laws of the United States, 
occurs in and affects foreign commerce, and causes and is designed to cause 
death and serious bodily injury to nationals in the United States while the 
nationals are outside of the United States.”70  Interestingly as well, the 
indictment alleges, as it must for jurisdictional purposes, that Alizai “will be 
first brought to and arrested in the Southern District of New York.”71  In order 
to effectuate Alizai’s arrest and transportation to the United States, Alizai was 
supposedly lured out of Afghanistan to Maldives.  According to press reports, 
Alizai sold about five kilograms of heroin in May 2008 to a DEA source in 
Afghanistan.  The source, two years later, posed as a Taliban representative 
wanting to arrange the sale of six AK-47 assault rifles and an additional ten 
kilograms of heroin.   
 In the second prosecution, it is alleged that Heareh, Aksu, and Wehbe 
arranged to import hundreds of kilograms of heroin into the United States, 
telling DEA informants that they would use the proceeds of the drug sales to 
buy weapons for Hezbollah.  The men also allegedly signed a written 
agreement in Malaysia to buy, among other things, 48 American-made Stinger 
missiles, 5,000 AK-47 assault rifles, and 1,000 handguns for $9.5 million.  
Needless to say, all four narco-terrorism defendants were detained pre-trial, 
which, in many ways, is the least of their problems; all four are facing potential 
sentences of life without parole.   
 The Alizai case, while the most recent and, perhaps, the most 
spectacular, is not the only example of the United States extending the reach of 
its long arm of the law beyond its own borders, in the commingling of both the 
war on drugs and war on terror.  The authority for this type of “long-arm” 
arrest can be found in the aptly described “Narco-Terrorism” legislation 
enacted by Congress in 2006.  21 U.S.C. § 960a is extraordinary enough to cite 
substantially:  
Whoever engages in [drug activity] that would be 
punishable . . . if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States . . . knowing or intending to provide, directly 
or indirectly, anything of pecuniary value to any person or 
organization that has engaged or engages in terrorist activity 
. . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less 
than twice the minimum punishment [otherwise required for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Indictment, United States v. Alizai, No. 10-CR-799 at 6–7 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 9, 
2010), available at 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/07/26/Gul%20Alizai,%20Taza%20S1%20Indictment%
20-%20signed.pdf. 
71 Id. at 3. 
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the drug crime].  
 
Thus, any drug-related crime, committed anywhere in the world, by any 
person, no matter how remote or indeed non-existent the link with the United 
States, is now subject to being charged and tried in a U.S. federal court, after 
being transported, most often forcibly, to United States territory.72  Indeed, the 
Department of Justice readily acknowledges that it has brought a “number of 
cases under Section 960A of Title 21, the narco-terrorism statute, to disrupt 
individuals and networks attempting to use narcotics proceeds to finance 
terrorist organizations” including FARC, the Taliban, and al Qaeda.73  The 
room for prosecutorial abuse in these instances seems virtually self-evident.  
 Another recent example is the Jamal Yousef case before the Southern 
District Court of New York. The government alleges that Yousef and unnamed 
co-conspirators agreed to provide military-grade weapons to an individual 
purporting to represent the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia), which is on the U.S. government designated terrorist organization 
list.74  In July 2006, Yousef was arrested and convicted in Honduras of 
passport fraud and illegal firearm protection. According to the government, 
Yousef was transferred from a Honduran prison to a chartered plane that 
brought him to New York, following an extradition agreement.75  According to 
the defendant in his motion to dismiss the indictment for outrageous 
government conduct, he was released from the Honduran prison, and after he 
exited the prison, abducted by men with automatic weapons, taken into a truck, 
forced to sit with his head down, driven with an escort to a helicopter, and then 
transferred to a jet. Once aboard the plane, he was informed that the other 
passengers were U.S. agents, including one DEA Special Agent. The agents 
read Yousef his rights, and presented him with a Miranda waiver form in 
Spanish, which he signed.76  
 In denying Yousef’s motion to suppress the indictment based on 
outrageous government conduct, the Southern District Court of New York 
found that nothing in the U.S.-Honduras extradition treaty precluded either !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72  21 U.S.C. § 960a (2006). 
Rumor has it, for example, that Alizai was convinced by undercover DEA agents to leave 
Afghanistan on a pretext. He was then flown to Dubai, then to the Maldives where he was 
arrested.  
73 Countering Terrorist Financing: Progress and Priorities, Statement of Lisa O. Monaco, 
Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-9-21MonacoTestimony.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 
2012).    
74 The FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is included in the list of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) designated by by the Secretary of State in accordance with 
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  See Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, May 19, 2011, 
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.  
75 United States v. Yousef, 2011 WL 2899244 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2011).  
76 Id. at *2. 
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party from committing forcible abductions.77  The court also examined the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence establishing that “the use of unconventional 
methods to secure a defendant’s appearance in the United States does not strip 
the Government of the power to prosecute the defendant.”78 
 Another example illustrates what narco-terrorism defendants can expect 
once they have arrived in the United States.  Jose Maria Corredor-Ibague was 
the first person to be indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 960a, the narco-terrorism 
statute.79  Corredor-Ibague, together with nine other defendants, is alleged to 
have controlled a clandestine airstrip in the jungles of Southern Colombia, 
from which small aircraft transported hundreds of kilograms of cocaine to the 
United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Europe.80 The link between these activities 
and terrorism is that the defendant is alleged to have charged a “tax” on these 
shipments, which he remitted to the FARC. In addition, the airstrip was 
allegedly used by planes bringing weapons to the FARC.  Corredor-Ibague was 
arrested in October 200881 and he was, unsurprisingly, ordered detained 
without bond.82  In a separate indictment, Corredor-Ibague was also charged 
with two counts of material support to terrorist organizations.83 In both of 
those cases, no action seems to have been taken either to resolve the case or 
bring it to trial since June 2009.  
 What these extraterritorial84 narco-terrorism sting operations, 
investigations and arrests also point to is the obvious commingling of foreign 
intelligence information with domestic criminal investigators and vice-versa, a 
direct offshoot of the failure of both the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities to have detected 9/11 in advance.  While this issue has been 
exhaustively discussed in counterterrorism and legal circles, and legislation 
enacted to permit the same,85 its impact in domestic criminal prosecutions, as 
these narco-terrorism cases illustrate, is just beginning to be felt.  It remains to 
be seen how extensive these kinds of investigations become.  However, 
experience teaches that, like pre-trial detention statutes, more law enforcement 
tools and techniques usually result only in more investigations, prosecutions, 
and imprisonment.  Whether these tools result in safer streets and a safer world !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Id. at *5.  
78 Id. at *6. 
79 Jim Kouri, Colombian FARC Terrorists Extradited to US on Terrorism and Drug 
Charges, CANADA FREE PRESS, Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/5689. 
80 Id. 
81 United States v. Ibague, No. 1:4-CR-212 (D.D.C. filed May 3, 2004), ECF No. 121. 
82 Id. at ECF No. 129. 
83 United States v. Ibague, No. 1:6-CR-344 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 30, 2006). 
84 For a very interesting history of the evolving concept of “territoriality” in American law 
and foreign policy, see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG: THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).  
85 See, e.g., Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism 
Investigations, 3 CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf. See also [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. 
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is but another question, but suspicions remain if the War on Drugs and the 
current day violence in Mexico is any indicator.   
 Seeping into the landscape beyond straightforward terrorism and/or 
narco-terrorism prosecutions, furthermore, is a more subtle but equally 
ominous hybrid of cases where foreign intelligence information is being used 
in the prosecution of ostensibly domestic crimes.  It is not uncommon these 
days in routine federal court criminal prosecutions to encounter evidence 
obtained pursuant to searches or overhears conducted pursuant to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).86  Whether this is all for better or 
worse, one supposes, depends upon your view of the world and your priorities.  
But the political and moral overtones and ultimate ramifications of this 
commingling of both foreign and domestic policy issues between the wars on 
drugs and terror need at least to be continually examined.   
 Ominously, in public comments last Fall, in a speech before the 
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington D.C., Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton sparked tensions with Mexico when she compared the Mexican drug 
war to “an insurgency” akin to the situation in Colombia in the 1980s. Her 
specific comment is telling for our purposes: “[W]e face an increasing threat 
from a well-organized network, drug-trafficking threat that is, in some cases, 
morphing into or making common cause with what we would consider an 
insurgency, in Mexico and in Central America.” While Mexico rejected the 
comparison, the press raised speculation about whether Washington was 
pushing to increase its presence in Mexico.87  In the same speech, Secretary 
Clinton was also quoted as saying that “preventing the violence from spreading 
[in Mexico] required improved institutional capacity, particularly in law 
enforcement, together with military support and the political will to fight the 
cartels.”88  Secretary Clinton was also quoted in the same speech as saying that 
this was “a new American moment” in global politics and that the model of 
American leadership “offers our best hope in a dangerous world.”89  
 Secretary Clinton was also quoted in this Council on Foreign Relations 
speech as saying: “The world is counting on us.  When old adversaries need an 
honest broker or fundamental freedoms need a champion, people turn to us.”90 
With all due respect to Secretary Clinton, if what this truly means, as I suspect 
it does, is that this new American moment will have us exerting ourselves 
further into this dangerous world by exporting the War on Drugs and using our 
military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to fight that old war and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2008); see 
also David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 1, 4 (2011). 
87 See Tom A. Peter, Mexico Denies Hillary Clinton’s ‘Insurgency’ Comparison, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2010, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/324566.  
88 Clinton Says Mexico Drug Crime Like an Insurgency, BBC NEWS, Sept. 9, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11234058? (emphasis added). 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
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the increasingly aging War on Terror, please count me out.  Thirty-seven years 
of participating in one such war and now over ten in the other hardly kindles 
any warm feelings of honest brokering or championing of freedoms.   
 
 
 
